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Comments on "Malaria in China and Equatorial Pacific Area
from 1937 to 1943" by Isao Ebisawa
Malaria was the major medical problem confronting the allied military forces in
the campaign in the equatorial Pacific area from 1942 through 1945. In the period
1942 through 1943, the disease dominated military strategy. In the Solomon Is-
lands and New Guinea campaigns, American divisions such as the First Marine
Division, the Americal Division, the 25th and 43rd Infantry divisions had high
proportions of troops at least temporarily incapacitated due to malaria. Plas-
modium falciparum infections were a serious problem in the earlier phases. After
experience had been gained in the methodology of malaria suppressive regimes,
earlier with Atabrine, and toward the end of the war with chloroquine, Plasniodium
vivax became the more prominent infection. Plasmodium malariae was only infre-
quently seen, and Plasmodium ovale was not reported. The impact of malaria was
seen most particularly under actual combat conditions, where suppressive regimes
might be temporarily forgotten. Plasmodium vivax infections, ordinarily sup-
pressed, broke through the lowered suppressive barrier. Fortunately, the multiple
drug-resistant P. falcipar-um strains encountered in the historically recent Vietnam
campaigns were either absent or insignificant in the WW II period.
When combat units were removed from malarious areas and rested up in rear
bases (New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, or British Samoa) controlled studies were
made of the effects of discontinuing Atabrine suppression. The results were dra-
matic. In the 147th Infantry regiment, for example, of 1311 individuals followed
for 6 months after discontinuing Atabrine suppression, only 106 did not come
down with P. vivax malaria.
The situation in the Japanese garrisons in the equatorial Pacific islands can only
be surmised. The small number of captives taken were almost invariably malarious.
Availability and appropriateness of antimalarial drugs employed by the Japanese,
either as therapeutic or suppressive agents was probably curtailed as Japanese sup-
ply lines were progressively interrupted. It can only be guessed, but almost certainly
correctly, that crippling as malaria was for the Allied forces, it was much more
crippling for the Japanese.
This in turn must have influenced the malaria experiences of the Allied forces
greatly. As Japanese cantonment areas, occupied by malarious Japanese troops
were successively invaded and occupied by unseeded Allied forces, these forces
certainly encountered anopheline populations heavily loaded with malaria sporo-
zoites, and completely ready to pass the curse of the Japanese garrison on to the
newly arrived susceptible invaders. A victorious occupation could be followed in
a couple of weeks by devastating malaria. This was certainly seen on Guadacanal,
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the Russell Islands, and New Georgia. After these dismal campaigns were over
and history, the "Freon bomb" appeared (the now familiar aerosol insecticide dis-
penser). With a small squad equipped with these "bombs," the resident anopheline
population of a newly occupied cantonment area could be "blitzed" most effec-
tively, and the chain of malaria transmission stretching from the vanquished to
the victors could thus be broken at the weak link of the malaria vector.
The information presented here by Dr. Ebisawa does not extend to the New
Guinea-Solomon Island region, but does present most interesting information on
the prevalence and types of malaria in Japanese naval forces in Southeast Asia
and the Chinese mainland. The actual figures presented are unfortunately not con-
vertible into rates. However, it is evident that in the 1938 Wu-Han campaign for
example, the figure of 151,648 cases of malaria in a 6-month period must have
influenced the conduct of the campaign considerably. One may wonder what the
situation was among the Chinese troops.
Questions are raised by Ebisawa's paper which cannot be answered from the
data available. The malaria figures are not broken down into primary and relapsing
cases. Drugs employed in treatment are not stated. It is obvious that the drug treat-
ment regimen could significantly affect the relapse pattern. There are no data fur-
thermore on malaria suppressive regimes, and again malaria rates and malaria
species incidence could be very significantly altered by the type of suppressive
regime employed.
The map reproduced from Ho's 1965 paper illustrating the malaria picture on
the Chinese mainland, with P. vivax prevalent north of 300 N, and P. falciparun
progressively more prevalent to the south presents indeed no new concept of ma-
laria species distribution, but does present information not readily available in
Western malaria publications.
It is evident that malaria constituted a serious problem for the Japanese military.
We get no hint as to how they reacted to this problem, and no assessment of its
overall importance as a determinant of the course of the Japanese military ventures.
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